This post is a look at whether teleology can ever be understood in secular terms. And the suggestion is that it is better understood in secular terms.
I think most will agree that terms are often best explicated in relation to other terms- either ones with similar meanings or otherwise ones with opposing meanings. For this reason then an expedient comparative analysis of deontology and teleology.
Mostly these two terms are spoken of in relation to each other in discourses seated in moral philosophy. But the use of these terms can and are extended to other discourses. We start with the moral. Kant’s theories are said to be forwarding a deontological notion of moral action or deliberation. This means that, for Kant, all moral decision making should be done according to a sense of duty. Moral duty in particular. According to deontological theories it is wrong to base any moral deliberation, and the eventual moral action based on this deliberation, on what will be the consequences of that action. To do this would be to take into account the contingent nature of the context in which the moral action takes place. And the contingent context is variable, unreliable and based in the part of reality which has everything to do with the sensory world and, therefore, nothing to do with the overarching, rationally pure and perfectly stable world of law. Principles, principles and more principles. Principles simply are not dependent on the ‘the nature of things’ to make them either right or wrong. If this were the case they would, by definition, not be a principle.
On account of the above, deontological theory suggests that in our moral decision making we do what is right and wrong based in moral duty. And such duty is a priori associated with the action in question. There are no mitigating circumstances which could way in on a situation and which could serve as possible reasons for making a decision contrary to the a priori correctness of a moral law or imperative. So, according to Kant’s deontology, our focus as moral agents should be on moral duty, on the principles which provide the imperatives for certain actions to be either considered right or wrong, and not what would be the consequences of either choosing to act or not. Graphically put: we look into the moral nature of the action itself and our duty which we have around such as action, and not outwards towards the future consequences of this action.
Teleological theory suggests that we base or moral decision making on what the consequences of an action would be. In other words, the suggestion is that our motivations for actions are seated in the contingent world which surrounds things such as moral actions. Depending on what sort of teleological theorist one is it will either be claimed that the consequences of actions do, despite our best intentions and maybe even resistance, form the reasons for our actions. In other words, whether we agree with the deontologists or not, in principle (excuse the pun), it simply is the case that the future outcomes of moral actions are the reasons which propel us towards making such decisions. And not things like over arching moral laws which we abide by as rational and moral agents.
But whether it is the consequences of actions or the moral duty rationally embedded in moral actions which motivate, or ought to motivate, us to act is not for this posting.
What is, however, for this posting is whether or not teleology must, by definition, imply something theological. In other words, when we say that certain things ‘happen for a reason’ do we necessarily, or logically, refer to something like a divine plan? Firstly, from the above it should be significantly clear that both deontological and teleological views propose that ‘things happen for a reason’. But these reasons, as we have seen, are not the same. So, if it is being claimed that teleological thinking is always based in some sort of religious thinking it could be claimed this for deontology as well. If god, or a prime mover, is the inspiration giving rise to all action (not just moral action) and design in nature it is just as feasible to say that god or a prime mover has laced all action and design, moral and natural, with the imperatives for their existence- regardless of what the outcomes of their existence and design would have on their contingent environment or how they are influences by these environments.
But, secondly, the point really is, that neither teleology nor deontology need subscribe to theology for semantic sense. A Darwinian theory about design, for instance, is a perfectly good description of why certain things happen in nature. The reasons for design and dynamics in nature are ascribed to the consequences thereof in the larger context of nature or to the future survival of a species of some kind. So change, action or even design is based in reasons which have to do with sustaining or bringing about more change, action or design. With no reference being made to ultimate or absolute goals and or ends needing to be achieved. The actions and the reasons for these actions all reside within a closed system. If the argument seems circular to the astute reader, then I caution that it may the content forwarding a secular explanation of ‘things happen for a reason’ which is confusing you thus. Read again.
But why, some ask mysteriously, is the human mind so designed as to be constantly thinking of the big ‘why’ questions. Yes, we may be able to see that this empirically based reason explains why that happens. But such reasons cannot give an account of what it is all about. Why all of this? What is it all for? What is it all aiming to achieve? It is because of this predisposition of ours that we come up against answers of a non-secular nature. And then, of course, the next reasonable question must be, but why are we made thus. There must surely be a reason why our minds are fashioned in a way to be constantly bringing us to these overarching questions leading to their overarching answers. This question itself seems to be enough evidence for some that everything has a greater goal. One seated outside of the material systems.
Here is a suggestion: We are fashioned thus because meaning making is part of our need to and ability to use language. And the use of language has directly to do with our imperative to survive and maybe even for our pursuits in the abstract arts. (But this is for another discussion, dear reader.) The fact that this faculty for meaning making gets us, in an obsessive sort of way, to answer perfectly natural questions with religious answers is a by product of evolutionary imperatives. But maybe, hopefully, we shall be losing this cumbersome tendency like the birds on the Galapagos Islands are losing their wings. Because the use for these have become redundant. It just takes some time. In the meantime, it is perfectly within reason to take teleology as a term which does not, necessarily, have a religious basis.
I think most will agree that terms are often best explicated in relation to other terms- either ones with similar meanings or otherwise ones with opposing meanings. For this reason then an expedient comparative analysis of deontology and teleology.
Mostly these two terms are spoken of in relation to each other in discourses seated in moral philosophy. But the use of these terms can and are extended to other discourses. We start with the moral. Kant’s theories are said to be forwarding a deontological notion of moral action or deliberation. This means that, for Kant, all moral decision making should be done according to a sense of duty. Moral duty in particular. According to deontological theories it is wrong to base any moral deliberation, and the eventual moral action based on this deliberation, on what will be the consequences of that action. To do this would be to take into account the contingent nature of the context in which the moral action takes place. And the contingent context is variable, unreliable and based in the part of reality which has everything to do with the sensory world and, therefore, nothing to do with the overarching, rationally pure and perfectly stable world of law. Principles, principles and more principles. Principles simply are not dependent on the ‘the nature of things’ to make them either right or wrong. If this were the case they would, by definition, not be a principle.
On account of the above, deontological theory suggests that in our moral decision making we do what is right and wrong based in moral duty. And such duty is a priori associated with the action in question. There are no mitigating circumstances which could way in on a situation and which could serve as possible reasons for making a decision contrary to the a priori correctness of a moral law or imperative. So, according to Kant’s deontology, our focus as moral agents should be on moral duty, on the principles which provide the imperatives for certain actions to be either considered right or wrong, and not what would be the consequences of either choosing to act or not. Graphically put: we look into the moral nature of the action itself and our duty which we have around such as action, and not outwards towards the future consequences of this action.
Teleological theory suggests that we base or moral decision making on what the consequences of an action would be. In other words, the suggestion is that our motivations for actions are seated in the contingent world which surrounds things such as moral actions. Depending on what sort of teleological theorist one is it will either be claimed that the consequences of actions do, despite our best intentions and maybe even resistance, form the reasons for our actions. In other words, whether we agree with the deontologists or not, in principle (excuse the pun), it simply is the case that the future outcomes of moral actions are the reasons which propel us towards making such decisions. And not things like over arching moral laws which we abide by as rational and moral agents.
But whether it is the consequences of actions or the moral duty rationally embedded in moral actions which motivate, or ought to motivate, us to act is not for this posting.
What is, however, for this posting is whether or not teleology must, by definition, imply something theological. In other words, when we say that certain things ‘happen for a reason’ do we necessarily, or logically, refer to something like a divine plan? Firstly, from the above it should be significantly clear that both deontological and teleological views propose that ‘things happen for a reason’. But these reasons, as we have seen, are not the same. So, if it is being claimed that teleological thinking is always based in some sort of religious thinking it could be claimed this for deontology as well. If god, or a prime mover, is the inspiration giving rise to all action (not just moral action) and design in nature it is just as feasible to say that god or a prime mover has laced all action and design, moral and natural, with the imperatives for their existence- regardless of what the outcomes of their existence and design would have on their contingent environment or how they are influences by these environments.
But, secondly, the point really is, that neither teleology nor deontology need subscribe to theology for semantic sense. A Darwinian theory about design, for instance, is a perfectly good description of why certain things happen in nature. The reasons for design and dynamics in nature are ascribed to the consequences thereof in the larger context of nature or to the future survival of a species of some kind. So change, action or even design is based in reasons which have to do with sustaining or bringing about more change, action or design. With no reference being made to ultimate or absolute goals and or ends needing to be achieved. The actions and the reasons for these actions all reside within a closed system. If the argument seems circular to the astute reader, then I caution that it may the content forwarding a secular explanation of ‘things happen for a reason’ which is confusing you thus. Read again.
But why, some ask mysteriously, is the human mind so designed as to be constantly thinking of the big ‘why’ questions. Yes, we may be able to see that this empirically based reason explains why that happens. But such reasons cannot give an account of what it is all about. Why all of this? What is it all for? What is it all aiming to achieve? It is because of this predisposition of ours that we come up against answers of a non-secular nature. And then, of course, the next reasonable question must be, but why are we made thus. There must surely be a reason why our minds are fashioned in a way to be constantly bringing us to these overarching questions leading to their overarching answers. This question itself seems to be enough evidence for some that everything has a greater goal. One seated outside of the material systems.
Here is a suggestion: We are fashioned thus because meaning making is part of our need to and ability to use language. And the use of language has directly to do with our imperative to survive and maybe even for our pursuits in the abstract arts. (But this is for another discussion, dear reader.) The fact that this faculty for meaning making gets us, in an obsessive sort of way, to answer perfectly natural questions with religious answers is a by product of evolutionary imperatives. But maybe, hopefully, we shall be losing this cumbersome tendency like the birds on the Galapagos Islands are losing their wings. Because the use for these have become redundant. It just takes some time. In the meantime, it is perfectly within reason to take teleology as a term which does not, necessarily, have a religious basis.
2 comments:
Thank you
I have couple of questions that are not rhetorical.
Deontology; firstly who decides what the duties are and on what is that based? Is there a hierarchy of duties and who decides that? Is duty just obeying god's commands without questioning them (cf orthodox jews)?
Secondly what happens when the duties are conflicting? Sacrifice one to save two. Would Kant have shot down those planes going into the twin towers to save the thousands or struck down the pilot dropping nuclear bombs on Japan? If the answer to either of those questions is yes, then does he lose his principles? If no, then the same question.
Teleology; I accept that teleology can be part of a secular world view but it seems to me that as soon as teleology is used one's secular world takes on (dangerous) religious trappings. Marxism for instance.
The Reverend Darwin himself was definitely a teleological thinker, being clear that evolution was part of a divine plan and design. It seems to me that evolutionists share the same belief in a covert way. The problem seems to be with the word design; it goes backwards as well as forwards. 'I can use tools more easily because of the design of my opposable fingers' or 'I have designs on you' but 'the bee is designed to collect nectar'. In the last statement does design refer to an accident of evolution after numerous trials and errors or is there some sense that 'evolution' has designed something and is working towards some kind of perfection? You use the word design in a teleological sense yourself in your posting when, in the same sentence, you associate design with 'future survival of a species'.
Can one though, as a moral being, subscribe to one's actions as being teleological while eschewing political systems that show the same characteristic (as we all should should after the horrors of European 20th century history {that is from 1900 to 1999!})? Or would that make one inconsistent? This, again is not a rhetorical question.
Dear Anonymous
Your questions address exactly some of the most contentious objections to and features of these theories. Let me see if I can engage them a little.
Who decides. Naturally, if anyone proposes that there simply are overarching moral duties that determine the rightness/wrongness of an action, the the next question should be what are those and who decides which duties are the right ones.
Let me say something for Kant on this behalf, but there are other theorists claiming similar things for different reasons. Kant certainly does not ever put forward even one moral duty as an absolute. He forwards a meta-theoretical template for how we determine what are our moral duties. This template is constructed in a very complex way, to complex to teach here. Let is suffuce to say that there are two rules making up this template (called the Categorical Imperative): the one is that we always treat other people as an end in themself basec on the fact that they have instrinsic value (and this is based on the fact that they are rational human beings). The second rule is that of consistency. In other words, we cannot take anything to be a moral rule if we would not alo be willing to live in a world where we would be happy to be on either side of action determined by that rule (if would be happy to have your property stolen or to made a slave them it would be rationally permissible to universalise and accept slavery as morally right- maybe even an imperative).
The important thing to realise about Kant is that he claims that if everyone were being supremely ('perfectly' nearly in the Greek sense)there would be no disagreements about the moral laws of which he speaks. In other words he thinks that they logical necessities (Aristotelian logic).
In order to avoid conflicting duties the articulation of the duties (as propositions- It is right to always tell the truth.)can have subclauses (It is right to always tell the truth unless the truth will hurt another person.) Clearly he is and has run into insurmountable theoretical instabilities with this one.
I think get you point about teleological theories falling into religious trappings. Let me see, you say that, even if the content is entirely secular the form of teleological thinking takes on a religious form. This presumably is because there is 'higher goal' sort of aesthetic about it. Am I right?
Let me clarify my use of the word design: If I say that this hammer is perfectly designed for hitting nails, am I covertly refering to something overarching or could I simly be referring to some advantageous, maybe even accidentally advantageous, features of the hammer for this specific action. Okay, granted someone made that hammer for the hitting of nails so there was some sort of prime mover, ultimate designer, of the hammer. But, and this is the point with evolution, sometimes, when conditions in the environment change (which is as random as nature can be and certainly does not in itself imply a prime mover) some animate objects, which have built in the abiloty to change their features, survive the change in conditions and some don't. Lucky for the ones who had the right features and unlucky for those who did not. Where is the religious trapping there. Things change and some other things happen to have the necessary charachetistics for survival and some don't. Those that do get to have sex and make babies and those that don't don't.
Evolution happens in retrospect. It is not in itself some sort of mystical force dragging or herding things towards perfection, it is something one can look back on when certain species have adapted and changed to survive changing conditions. And some haven't. Just the fact that some species do not means that teleology in a religious sense must be questioned when speaking of evolution. Were the species who did not survive sinful, maybe?
Thank you for entertaining me again.
Post a Comment