Let us try again. My apologies to my more discerning readers for the previous post on the positivists.
Same introduction: One thing is certain, if only simple lessons are intended, I should find it an easier task to speak about the positivists than any other theoretical movement in philosophy. And this is exactly the way the positivists would have liked it- the outcomes of their doctrine being comparatively minimalist and their campaign aimed at simplicity.
It should, however, be cautioned that, as within all specialised schools of thought, there exists disagreement, so by no means must the following very superficial explication of positivist theory be taken as the unequivocal conclusions reached by all positivist theorists themselves. But then it has never been claimed that the writings posted to this blog set out to forward a deep and thorough analysis of anything, even though its author makes every attempt to be careful in her summaries and as precise as possible in her representations of others’ thoughts.
Inspired by Hume’s explanation of only two types of truths, the necessary and the contingent, the logical positivists maintained that only propositions which are either necessarily true/false (true by definition) or are contingently true/false (can be shown to be true/false by the certain matters of fact) can have any sort of meaning. And here, I hope, the astute reader will notice that ‘meaning’ has suddenly become a new character in our play.
For the positivist the most effective way of addressing the problems of philosophy is first to address and resolve the problems with philosophy. The problem with philosophy, dear reader, is that it at times sets out to do things which it is not adequately positioned to do. The positivists took offence and devised a plan to clean up the foundations of philosophy. The strategy was to take the products of philosophy, the foundational propositions which comprise the premises and conclusions of the arguments of philosophers, and to scrutinise them for their efficacy. The hypothesis was that if the propositions themselves are without meaning, are vacuous statements with no bearing on the world which they attempt to denote, then the arguments themselves will never take hold (except on our imaginations maybe).
And it is because of this method of the positivists that the author has employed, as from lesson one, the methodology of making propositions, which are linguistic objects aimed at conveying meaning and the component parts of philosophical arguments, the objects of our study.
Taking this proposition: “God is good.”
The logical positivists maintained, in short, that each component part of a proposition must be reducible to observable data. Complex concepts and ideas are permissible if and only if their component parts are grounded in simple observational, or sensory, data and that the particular suggestion around the relationship between the various sensory objects to which the proposition is making reference, can also be verified empirically. So if, for instance, a causal relationship is being referred to the causal relationship must, itself, be observable and not just the objects presumably in the causal relationship. (And we know from one of our previous lessons that it is impossible to observe causality. At most we get some sort of inductively inferred correlation always up for refutation.)
Let us take a look at what happens in a proposition such as: “God is good.”
If the claim is that an object ‘X’ has the property of being ‘Y’ then it is not only a semantic requirement that ‘X’ and ‘Y’ be traceable- in principle- but that the claimed relationship of ‘X’ to ‘Y’ be traceable.
Is there any observational data which the term ‘God’ could be referencing? It seems, by the very definition of ‘God’ this is not possible. God is above the sensory. This is logically (and conveniently) required for god to be what he is. We see that the term ‘God’ is not illogical in itself, of course, but is certainly not empirically traceable to an object in a material reality. And ‘good’? The property of goodness is, evidently, not traceable either. People sometimes think that they have traced such a property (and it makes no difference whether it be ‘good’ of the aesthetic kind or the ‘ethical’ kind), but this is questionable for someone like a positivist.
For the sake of good sportsmanship, let us give the proposition the little head start it does not deserve. Let us assume that ‘God’ and ‘good’ are traceable objects and properties. The term ‘is’ still requires the one be a property of the other. However, if it were possible to track ‘God’ in the sense that the positivists require, I suggest, it is doubtful that it will be found that he is ‘good’- in the same manner as something, for instance, being green colour. Taking everything we know about god, his abilities and sentiments, I doubt if I would like to describe him as good.
Thus, if the statement, hypothetically, were to have meaning, at best it seems to turn out false. And at worst it is meaningless.
I take a stand here: The proposition is doomed to one of semantic barrenness and so are all propositions like this. At least those propositions which are intended by the speaker to be taken seriously in the literal sense. And, so, dear reader, we get to the positivist campaign against metaphysics in philosophy. But this is for the next time.
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5 comments:
You're good.
Never have those obscurantist brain boxes seemed so straightforward.
I will have more to ask, but for now, in what spheres of life do we thus consider propositions having meaning? Aesthetics and matephysics, no I guess. Ethics, social sciences, political philsophy - are their propositions considered verifiable?
Quite right, anonymous.
Aesthetics and metaphysics comprise meaningless statements for the die hard positivists. But there are other brands of positivism that will hold that such fields are open to metaphorical and figurativel language with appropriate meanings attached.
The problem with metaphysicians is that figurative meaning will not be good enough. The attempt is to describe reality quite literally.
Love the pic (something very busy going on in the background?) and the new industry.
Thank you for the clarification.
Firstly, where do the positivists stand on Hume's necessary truths? You don't mention them after the fourth para'. Is it because necessary truths seem to be tautological (to me) that they are not worth commenting on?
So all parts of a proposition need to be observable. Most scienific propositions involve cause and effect, but if causality is an unobservable phenomenon does that render scientific propostions meaningless? Take, 'if A then B'. Do we need to observe 'then' as well as'A' and 'B'?
Next, do we not have a problem with the concept of observable data. If I have observed God, does not the proposition 'God is a man' have meaning? Does the observation need to be repeatable to warrant the label verifiable?
If an event is observed by many and of regular occurence, such as the sightings of the Virgin Mary in Illinois, does this render the proposition 'The virgin mary visits us annually' meaningful. And, as it has been verified by a chosen few, render it true (I am probably outside the remit of philosophy by intorducing the idea of truth)?.
Then, there is the problem of observable events being altered by the act of observation. Not necessarily just in disciplines such as anthropology, but also in sub-atomic physics.
If propositions need to be verifiable, where does that leave us with a, by definition, unverifiable phenomenon (or maybe more accurately propostion) such as black holes.
Then we have '0-1=-1'. Mathematics is un-observable, but does this render it meaningless. Even if we subsitute physical objects for the symbols, how can we observe a minus cow in a cowless field?
I hope my problems are clear and look forward to the sharp clarity of your brain leading me from the murky gire and grimble in the wabe
Sorry about the absence of the picture. What can I say I my defence?
Firstly, the positivists completely accept the Hume's take on necessary truths, as explicated by the author, on the lesson on Hume. For the positivists there could only be two truths- those that are necessarily true (logically true-tautologies if you like)-and contingent truths which are the ones which need to be cobnstrained by knowledge (verification). But, do bear in mind that very few things are true tautologically. Not nearly enough to satisfy the metaphysicians of philosophy. So, they accpet whole heartedly Hume's necessary truths. And the only logical truths which are worth commenting on the ones which are necessarily true, such as 'All things which are blue have colour' (But this, to me, is not a tautology.)
Yes, the cause and effect reasoning of science does pose a problem for the logical positivists. I imagine that they would want to say about this, because 'cause' itself cannot be reduced to observational data, that at best propositions which involve 'cause' should be rephrased as propositions which make more explicit the inductive nature of causal reasoning, in order to be more meaningful.
Okay, and then the issue around observational data and how reliable this is, in the end:
Locke, a self-proclaimed but entirely useless empiricist, told us that perception is loaded. We all know, firstly, that the senses are not reliable. In other words, that sensory information does not necessarily represent the world out there.
I have to confess that I am not sure what the Vienna circle would have said, but let me strike out as a self proclaimed logical empricist- for now: If the terms in a proposition such as "The Virgin Mary visits us annually" all refer to a sensory experience that a certain group of people have then it only has meaning for the people who are able to make reference. So the meaning of the proposition is something very subjective (Wittgenstien's private language theory?). This is contrasted with the meaning of prpositions which, supposedly, make reference to sensory data which is objective by nature- in the sense that it is repeatable and predictable under a very stable set of conditions and circumstances to anyone who has a 'normal' set of perceptional apparatus.
But, dear anonymous, you have hit upon a very sensitive point for the positivists. And in one sense this could be called a red herring- because these theories are about the principles around these issues and not the effective applications- but in another sense it is exactly the right sort of attack that should be launched. particulrly to the positivists. Have they not fallen on their own sword?
Black holes (despite their present status) are quite acceptable components of a proposition provided that they are traceable. In other owrds, in principle, it should be possible for someone to recognise one when they find one and should be possible to find one in the first place.
Mathematics is safe because all mathemiatical propositions are analytically true (or false). They are therefore absolved from having to make reference to real objects. And, hence. absolved, from having to pressures of verification. They are true by definition- just using numbers.
Your problems are not only clear, they are profound. Quite incredible. Please read Michael Dummett on the metaphysical basis of logic.
Carin, thank you for your reply to my comments.
I think I don't understand what a tautolgy is. To me 'All things which are blue have colour' seems to be a tautology. I understand a tautology as being a repetition. As blue is a colour by definition is not that statement just repeating itself?
Your point about black holes was very well put and demonstrated my confusion between vision/light and observable. Using the word traceable was a stroke of gentle genius. Ditto for your point about re-phrasing propositions involving cause and effect.
I do have a problem with the reliability of sensory data, though. A problem which you seem to share? 'Normal'; hmmm. 'repeatable and predictable under a very stable set of conditions and circumstances' Okay we know that Mendel and Newton were genius charlatans, but now accept them as right (inherited traits and refraction of light, respectively). The chaps at CERN are observing occasional and rarely repeatable anomalies, from which they draw their conclusions. If their propositions are not verifiable due to the unreliabilty of reliably re-producing sub-atomic effects, does it mean that their propositions are meaningless?
I don't understand the 'analytical truth of mathematics' bit. If there are only necessary or contingent truths, where does maths fall? Also does not mathematics have reference to the real world?
I will read Mr Dummett; what book and where do I find it?
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