A bit of philosophy: Theorising about the real world

An investigation into a theoretical instability of metaphysical realism. (Giving the title some more thought, though.)

(i) What does this project entail?
The intention is to expose a fundamental theoretical instability within a particular species of realism within current metaphysical discourse. The species of realism in which I am interested is that which both endorses a Correspondence notion of truth and holds that truth is evident transcendent. I believe that these two positions cannot be appealed to within the same project as they are, a priori, inconsistent with each other.

During the writing of my master’s thesis, wherein I investigate the meaning of which moral language is capable of I look, particularly, at the debate which has been set up between realism and anti-realism, but taken as semantic theories and not as metaphysical positions. Basically the argument forwarded in my master’s thesis is that, despite moral language being inherently realist by nature it is incapable of doing what it sets out to do- and that is reference objective moral facts. That moral propositions have an inherently realist quality seems to be a relatively uncontroversial notion, based on the fact that moral statements seem, quite evidently, to make reference to moral imperatives which are taken not to be subjectively true but objectively so. In other words, implicit in moral language (and moral discourse) is an assumption that there simply are some objective moral facts (and truths). Following from this description of moral language there exists, in current philosophy, a host of meaning theories on how we are to understand and treat moral truth and, therefore, the semantics of moral language. In my master’s thesis I argued that the inherently realist nature of moral language, in other words the fact that moral statements seem to make reference to mind independent moral facts, means that moral truth should (ought to) be regarded as epistemically constrained and moral language ought to be subject to verificationist types of theories in order to, philosophically, determine what meaning moral language is actually capable of. This was, needless to say, argued counter realism and the way in which realist theorists propose that we treat the truth and meaning of moral statements. The result, I argued, of forwarding such standards (the standards I insist are required) for moral language is that moral propositions are very rarely, if ever, capable of the sort of truth which their inherently realist nature demands (or implies). The suggestion is, therefore, that there exists a tension between what moral language sets out to do and what it is, in fact, capable of.

What follows is a problem which arose from doing the above investigation and, of course, from constructing the argument. My work for my master’s thesis provided the base and exposed the need for further investigation into theories about meaning. But with the project constituting the following thesis on realism in metaphysics, I propose to focus, first and foremost, on some very particular issues around knowledge and truth, as these seems to underpin theories about meaning

Most theorists endorsing realism in metaphysics subscribe to the Correspondence Principle of truth: That a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts (taking “matter of fact” to mean a certain, relevant state of affairs in the world). This principle, clearly, serves as a sort of definition for what truth is or of how it should be conceived. My understanding of this realist commitment to Correspondence theories about truth is that realism is founded on a metaphysical position which holds that there are certain mind independent properties of and objects in the world, and when we speak our propositions can only be true of they correspond to the matters of fact which constitute this mind independent state of affairs. It, therefore, seems perfectly reasonable, given the particular metaphysical commitments described, that realism must appeal to some sort of correspondence notion about truth.

The dilemma (and this will be the central research problem of this thesis), resulting in the theoretical instability of which I wish to speak, arises from the fact that the success of metaphysical realism requires truth to be regarded as evidence transcendent, but this stands in direct opposition to what a Correspondence theory of truth seems, in my view, to require a priori: That the Correspondence Principle of truth is a vacuous and unhelpful principle, unless it presupposes or includes a requirement of knowledge of such correspondence. In other words, in order for truth to be settled by the correspondence of propositions to matters of fact, there must be some appeal to knowledge itself- in order to establish whether there is actual correspondence. The problem arises from the fact that an evidence transcendent notion of truth, however, dismisses this necessity entirely. In other words, it appears, to me, that a realist definition of truth is incongruent, at the very least, with the way in which truth is treated (that being the obeisance to the classical principle of truth being validly deduced across inferential lines and, therefore, immune to the any sorts of epistemic requirements). In short then: there seems to be a tension between a realist definition of truth and the manner in which truth is established or settled on, within metaphysics.

This project will look at the inherently non-epistemic workings of truth in metaphysical realism and what, in my view, seems to be the inherently epistemic nature of a definition such as Correspondence Principle about truth. In a sense, it is being suggested that realism cannot lay claims to correspondence notions about truth because it generally takes truth to be evidence transcendent. It must give up either, on pain of inconsistency. My suggestion, of course, is that it gives up the notion of truth being evidence transcendent.

I see the proposed project at this stage of its development, resting heavily on endorsing the clear and absolute distinction between logical truths and epistemic truths. Or, rather, between necessary truths and contingent truths. And, therefore, I think much of the success of this project will hinge on forwarding, yet again, an argument around this classical and foundational philosophical topic. In a sense, it will be necessary for the project to persuade of the necessity of adopting a Humean stance on the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and where these appropriately serve, and do not serve, a philosophical discourse.

Very sketchily, I shall have to argue primarily for the following points (of course, many contributory points will have to be argued first in order to achieve even these):

That confusing logical and epistemic truths leads to dubious reasoning in nearly all fields of study hoping to establish any substantive truths about the nature of reality.

That a Correspondence theory about truth should be seen to either presuppose or entail speaker knowledge of the conditions which would show that “P” does indeed represent (correspond to) P, if it is to form part of a realist project of forwarding conclusively settled substantive metaphysical truths.

That an appeal to truth as evidence transcendent, a priori, undermines a Correspondence theory of truth.


That, if the above premises can be argued successfully, realism in much of metaphysics is, fundamentally, theoretically unstable unless this sort of realism gives up either evidence transcendent truth or its appeal to a Correspondence Principle of truth.


That, if the above is successfully argued, accepting truth as epistemically constrained seems as if it could to a better job, when pinned to the Correspondence Principle of truth, of forwarding the case of realism in metaphysics.


(A note: I shall be selecting some very specific metaphysical propositions for the purposes of the thesis in order to illustrate my argument. It should be clear that I do not think all metaphysical realism is untenable- in other words, not all realist metaphysical propositions are problematic. It will depend on various factors such as the knowability of the content, the sense of the proposition and maybe even the linguistic context in which the proposition is expressed.)

(ii) Why is this project important and interesting?
It is conceded that the existing polemic between realism and anti-realism is well developed and has, to quite a large degree, formed a central topic in current analytical philosophy. This, however, does not mean that all the issues have been resolved. Nor does it mean, as suggested by Quietism, that there are no issues at stake or that the issues at stake cannot be resolved. It is my view that much work needs to be done in terms of theories about meaning, for instance, and that there is a genuine problem with realist language being employed within certain discourses. It is the task of philosophy, I believe, to develop workable theories around issues such as truth and meaning. And it simply is not the case that realist metaphysics in philosophy is on solid ground. This should, quite evidently, be a problem which needs solutions- even if the only solutions, with any sort of epistemological integrity, are those which do not bode well for this particular area in philosophy.