The Wealth of Nations: Differences and Trading

The next chapter of the book sees an argument for why there exists a natural inclination for man to want to specialise. Smith was, so it is said, from the empiricist mould so prevalent in Britian at the time. A contemporay of Hume's and, therefore, more than likely, theoretically aligned with philosophers such as Mill and Locke, he would have been interested in justifying his free trade theory by way of appealing to observable human nature. The British empiricists, whether they were doing moral or political philosophy were basically reductionist in their thinking. This means, for the new comer to this blog, that one category of facts (or even values) is reduced to some other category of facts. So, in economical theory, a person such as Smith- being both empiricist and reductionist- would have wanted to justify his reasons for why there should be specialisations based on the fact that human can be observed to be naturally predisposed to behaving in such a manner. And this inclination, Smith would want to say, is more than likely founded on the basic drive for survival (personal and then species).

This then is exactly what Smith does in his second chapter. He maintains that it is our predisposition to survival which has us specialising in our various occupations, as it is quite evident that in this way everyone has a better chance at thriving. Recall, dear reader, he has already explained the increase in efficiancy in his previous chapter. Furthermore, he says that our specific talents that we develop, which then give rise to what we choose to specialise in, are not based in inherent predispositions but rather by the way in which we are socialised as children. Smith seems keen to endorse that it is nurture and not nature which determines our talents and, therefore, our eventual occupations and trades. But the important point here is that no one specialises for morally based reasons of charity or philanthropy. Smith, subscribing once again to his empiricist leanings, and more than likely (but here I draw assumptions) also to some sort of Millsian psychological hedonism, will reason that all human action aimed at cooperation is not done for reasons of goodness or rightness, in the sense of moral virtue, but is rather based in utilitarian motivations of self interest.

Ah, it is so nice when a plan comes together. It is perfect when ideas fit so well.

However, the question that Smith will have to answer still is this. It is the same question as posed to him in my previous posting, but rephrased so as to incorporate our new vocabulary as we learn more about his wonderful theory. If it is agreed that humans cooperate for reasons of self interest then how will he explain the tendency (inclinations and predispositions) for humans to do the very things he will be arguing against? How does he explain, if not as immoral in the strict non-reductionist sense of the word, the existence of monopolies, duopolies and oligarchies?