The debate, of course, is long, involved and much divided. It is riddled with the pedantic, and not such pedantic, distinctions which so characterises philosophy. And for meta-ethics the theoretical positions being occupied range from:
1. A sort of post-modern relativism in morality (where morality is reduced to nothing more than social construction, along with truth and knowledge)
2. Absolute moral objectivity, such as what Kant proposes with the logical necessity of moral laws (i.e. the Categorical Imperative)
3. The metaphysical stance of moral values being real things, with mind independent existence, which it is our duty to track correctly as moral agents. This position alone can then be divided into: A. Meta-ethicists proposing that moral judgment is “particularist” (stupid word- if you ask me), with the moral value of action being judged according to a whole lot of contingent facts in the environment and within the agent, but that the values are nevertheless real (as in objective). Untenable, entirely, of course. B. A Platonic sort position holding the obscure claim of certain actions and things having an inherent or innate sort of value. And this is somehow mysteriously related to the “essence” of that thing. The Form- the Greek sense, of course. Surely God only knows what Plato meant by this. Which, unfortunately, does not aid human enquiry.
1. A sort of post-modern relativism in morality (where morality is reduced to nothing more than social construction, along with truth and knowledge)
2. Absolute moral objectivity, such as what Kant proposes with the logical necessity of moral laws (i.e. the Categorical Imperative)
3. The metaphysical stance of moral values being real things, with mind independent existence, which it is our duty to track correctly as moral agents. This position alone can then be divided into: A. Meta-ethicists proposing that moral judgment is “particularist” (stupid word- if you ask me), with the moral value of action being judged according to a whole lot of contingent facts in the environment and within the agent, but that the values are nevertheless real (as in objective). Untenable, entirely, of course. B. A Platonic sort position holding the obscure claim of certain actions and things having an inherent or innate sort of value. And this is somehow mysteriously related to the “essence” of that thing. The Form- the Greek sense, of course. Surely God only knows what Plato meant by this. Which, unfortunately, does not aid human enquiry.
The Juicy Bit: "But is it wrong to..."
So, dear reader and favourite person in the whole world, now that the theoretical map has been laid out, let us get to something a little more personal:
When Macbeth committed murder so foul, was it wrong because he was Scottish and, therefore, of a culture and religious persuasion which condemns murder? Was it wrong because it is irrational to commit murder if you yourself would not like to be subject to a murder? Or was it wrong because the action of murder itself, intrinsically, is wrong and will always be so- regardless of what the moral agent may think of it at any given time.
Or was it maybe not wrong of Macbeth to murder the Scottish king, because the particular circumstances, such as a very devious and persuasive wife, led him to believe that this action was justified?
But what does seem evident, is that nature and reason must come apart.
So, dear reader and favourite person in the whole world, now that the theoretical map has been laid out, let us get to something a little more personal:
When Macbeth committed murder so foul, was it wrong because he was Scottish and, therefore, of a culture and religious persuasion which condemns murder? Was it wrong because it is irrational to commit murder if you yourself would not like to be subject to a murder? Or was it wrong because the action of murder itself, intrinsically, is wrong and will always be so- regardless of what the moral agent may think of it at any given time.
Or was it maybe not wrong of Macbeth to murder the Scottish king, because the particular circumstances, such as a very devious and persuasive wife, led him to believe that this action was justified?
But what does seem evident, is that nature and reason must come apart.
Macbeth had to choose.
2 comments:
Now to firmer ground.
Is morality mind independent?
If it is not, does it make its existence any less real.
Truth, as 20th century maths and physics has taught us can be relative (speed of light etc, etc).
Okay.
Feelings of justice, fairness and morality seem to be universal attributes in mankind. Where does this come from?
Up until about 10,000 years ago we were nomadic hunter gatherers. The social constructs that were most successful during our long wandering period (in brief, carrying few goods - i.e. no property -, sharing your luck equally with others in the group, favours being reciprocated; very sketchy and ill-explained, but you get the gist) were hard wired into us as much as the different customs have been hard-wired into chimpanzees and bonobos, to name two obvious examples.
Could not our intensely moral feelings not be as a result of our long evolution as nomads whose survival depended on our small group? If this is so, then it does not make morality relativistic, but in our - human - world, absolute.
This is not philosophy, I know; I don't know what discipline it is - ethno-biography, social anthroplogy?? But does it have some relevance? If I am missing something fundamental and obvious, please don't hold back
I await your intelligent and wise (!) words
Just re-read that and it is terribly badly constructed but got to go now so it will have to do; sorry.
I get you gist, and it is not, at all, badly put.
I think you have a point about, shall we call it a sort of, moral values being relative absolutes. Absolute within a closed system, or language game (as Wittgenstein would have it). Furthermore, I think the socio-biological explanations for morality are very interesting, myself. They go quite some way to explaining this phenomenon in human behaviour. The appeal also being that such theories do not appeal to anything mysterious. However, how do such theories explain the tendency of self-sacrifice and altruism? Maybe they appeal to the "for the greater good" principle- survival of the species at times trumps persoanl survival.
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