Press for Freedom

Just a quick comment on the running debate about press freedom, dear Reader. If you are interested in freedom, not in a metaphysical sense but rather in a political sense, the following may be for you.

I am all for freedom, of course. In principle. But if I were any more, than in principle, for it, I may as well throw in the towel now, as they say. Because freedom, in the political (policy) sense, is nothing but an illusion at best and sophistry at worst. This is not just the case in South Africa but, in fact, seems to be the case in, what most of us regard as, the most liberal, progressive and democratic countries in the world. Yes, for those of you who thought the previous three terms all refer to the same quality, you will be horribly dissapointed. They come, very much, apart. But even though they are not mutually exclusive, they very rarely manage to co-exist as the combined features of one political entity such as a nation, state, nation state or country.

I have digressed. About freedom...

Constraining the press is, as always, based in nothing more than the posturing of a concern for national interest and the desire to classify certain material based in such supposed" interest". I purposefully use italics and our trusted inverted commas to communicate my scepticims about the integrity of such motives. It simply is hard to believe that the witholding of information can serve anyone's ends- unless they are a very young child.

So, yes, it is good and right that journalists, and the rest of the media gang, are offended and sceptical about the motives of our (South African) government for wanting to constrain the media. However, there are few things less attractive than the coincidental features of scepticism and naivity. And the naivity must be surely due to the fact that the constraining of the press is not only a feature of the dog eat dog nature of humanity (cf Orwell), but is an actual world wide phenomenon. So, there really is no need to get so upset unless this is directed at humanity in general. 'National interest' and 'classifiable' information have been some of the most utilised tools by countries such as America, England and Australia. And not only by the countries which we all expect to be overmuscled, in terms of population control and bully tactics, with no overtly demostrated respect for personal and societal freedom.

My suggestion then, to the champions of press freedom, is that the press should clean up the conceptual groundwork of its campaign and, once this is done, decide what messages make actual sense. And to the governments of the world: The sensationalist language and other insiduous trickery employed by many journalists (and I do not refer here to tabloid gossip but also to serious journalism) is a better reason for constraining the press than the present pseudo concern for national interest.

An Exercise in, and comment on, Cryptic

Lungimus armis.

Communes habetur cognitio relaxat.

Lungimus armis.

Diligens requies habetur.

(Using Tolstoy's link between 'knowledge' and 'love')

Cryptic language or code

Sometimes, dear Reader, it's personal. Sometimes, of course,

it is not, but will, nevertheless, taken to be so. The point of cryptic language is that it only rings true for those who already believe that they know to what the communication is making reference. For the rest such terms, assertions and symbols are meaningless.

The wrong and right of Dr Faustus

Very often people want to know what the purpose of something is.

So when Faustus wakes from his scholastic slumber to discover that all his bookish wisdom is but nothing if not able to transform reality he, in that moment, becomes a pragmatist about knowledge. This epiphany has, naturally, dire consequences for him. Why, one wonders. And we wonder thus because maybe we are innately conditioned to think that real value can only be defined as the sort of value an object, action or person has in and for itself; as opposed to when we think of things as valuable in relation to their function. This is when we are corrupting what value essentially is.

However, Faustus, despite his intelligence and education, becomes obsessessed with the thought of using his wisdom for a greater (not as in divine but rather as in more effective) end. This is the first indication of his slide into evil. Just that sentiment in itself.

The fact that he then makes a deal with the devil, unlimited power in exchange for his soul, to put into action his scholastic knowledge is only the second move towards his demise. The third being, naturally, his lust for Helen of Troy, whom he conjures up in response to a sort of 'dare'. He was, after all, just a man. And maybe Marlowe is clever here. Is not Faustus' love for Helen what ingratiates him to us, in the end? Is this not why we cringe to think of him burning for an eternity in hell?

So, when Faustus asks for and then insists that he becomes supremely effective in the base world of ordinary man, he steps out of the virtue of the ivory tower into the moral quagmire of a more visceral reality. Ah, the ancient Greek duality lives on, dear Reader! But Faustus learns to take risks, he falls in love and he destroys himself in the end.

So when, if ever, dear Reader, is power illicit?

A tiny bit of philosophy: Abstractions

Are notions of objective knowledge and truth really any more tenable than relativist and constructivist notions of such things?

A brief critique of Boghossian’s Fear of Knowledge

This paper could be construed, in part, as a critique of Paul Boghossian’s Fear of Knowledge. It will give both accolades where this is due as well as elaborate on certain fundamental disagreements with his primary conclusion.

It seems obvious that the social construction of knowledge about issues such as, for instance, the origins of matter must lead to a priori inconsistent ‘truths’ about an event that can surely not be a matter of opinion. Boghossian, therefore, has my sympathies in his pursuit to expose the deep fallacies of epistemic relativism. And ‘equal validity’ just cannot, as Boghossian wisely argues, effectively resist the accusation of the overt irrationality of holding that many beliefs could be true about, what seems to be accepted by all as, only one event.
However, on account of the difficulties of locating an absolute system of thought by which to judge which relative and specific conceptual network, or system of rules, is the correct one by which to, then, judge which beliefs are actually true, it becomes indeed hard to side step the relativist challenge. And the relativist succeeds, thus, to lock us into a somewhat sceptical quagmire. Or a ‘norm-circularity’, according to Boghossian.
The suggestion with this paper is that Boghossian would have done better to have ended his project with a counter argument which looks more like a sceptical position, rather than proceed to argue in favour of some sort of defence for knowledge based in the real possibility of objectively located knowledge and truth. Since, in doing the latter, he finds himself in an awkward position of having to resort to attacking a straw-man; weak and strong constructivism.
But winning ground here, which, naturally, he does very easily, unfortunately, does not get him to where he claims it does: that it seems to be intuitively true ‘that there is a way things are which is independent of human opinion, and that we are capable of arriving at belief about how things are that is objectively reasonable, binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence regardless of their social or cultural perspective’.

A response: Is the internet making us stupid?

Dear Reader

On having been recently exposed, by a very astute and wonderful person, to a beautifully written (I cannot dream to compete) article in The Economist, I have decided to air my views. For your benefit; the article claims that it is a falsely held belief that our levels of intelligence have declined with the rise in internet usage.

Before I deliver my critique it would please me to give credit where credit is due. The article is, as already mentioned, exceptionally well articulated. Not enough can be said to give gratitude to the author for this feature. Then, N.V. (which is the only reference I can find to the author's name), is also very careful to give the opponents' views proper and generous representation. Great effort is made to illucidate the many points in favour of why the internet is a contributing factor to the decline in intelligence. N.V. also offers the reader the strongest case for the other side of the debate which, naturally, would make his victory all the more respectable and sweeter. The author alludes to the fact that the eloquence of founders of Facebook and Twitter may, very well, fare badly when compared with that of decently educated Victorians and Georgians. N.V. mentiones Carr's recent investigations into the decline of intelliegnce in America. The author boldly exposes how badly American children fare in reading, mathematics and science in OECD rankings in the world- particularly for an English speaking and developed country. I think that N.V. then states that the real reasons for this failure is known and accepted but the 'corrective measures' remain 'politically intractable'. I am, however, unclear as to whether the suggestion is that there are reasons for this decline in intelligence, but that the internet is being scapegoated because the 'real' reasons for, or problems giving rise to this phenomenon, are not solvable or that the phenomenon seems to have been misunderstood and, subsequently, misrepresented altogether. I think the author is making a case for a new type of intelligence: If intelligence is a function of a relationship between adaptability and changing environments, then a new generation's seeming lack of intelligence is merely a manifestation of a new type of thinking, suited to new environmental pressures. And these include the excessive availability of huge quantities of inferior quality information. The suggestion: that most of the older generation are measuring intelligence by outmoded and irrelevant standards. Pure sentimentality.

And it is precisely here where my primary complaint lies. It is not entirely clear to me whether N.V. is acknowledging that there is a decline in intelligence, but that it is not attributable to internet usage, or whether the author is claiming that there is no decline in intelligence at all? If the latter, then it seems fair to suggest that, in the event of there not being a decline in intelligence at all, we need not worry about tracking the causes, do we? However, taking the OECD rankings to be of some significance, let us assume that there are, according to those callibrations, the decline which N.V. either is or is not acknowledging.

Thus, we must, I hope you agree, continue from the premise that there is, indeed, some sort of ailment lurking in the intelligence of American youths, at least. But it is here that the thinking of N.V. does a loop, making it not unlike a little circular argument. The author then focusses attentions on debunking, very eloquently and impressively systematically, all the commonly held reasons for the drop in intelligence, but then does the extraordinary leap to concluding that there, for this reason, is no decline in intelligence.

N.V. needs to decide whether the evidence showing a decline in intelligence is being contested to start with, or whether he or she would like to contest some specific beliefs about the reasons therefore.

However, I am happy to assume that all the debunking is done on solid ground: So, the brain is wired for its potential intelligence before children are even able to use a computer. That Kindles (electronic books) have been extremely well received by society and that this must surely be an indication that people are, in fact, reading. And that people spend much less time on the internet than is suspected. However, if the author is correct, then surely the only conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence faced with (that there is a decline in intelligence and that people are reading more and spending less time on the internet than supected) is that if there were a lack of reading and an increase in internet usage these factors could not be blamed for the drop in intelligence. But what cannot be assumed is that, because the usual reasons given for the drop intelligence do not stand their ground that, therefore, the drop in intelligence does not exist.

Secondly, it is being acknowledged, herewith, that N.V. might be merely claiming that the 'decline in intelligence' is not a real decline but rather a change in type of intelligence. But this, to me, seems like side stepping the issue entirely. The accusors, of whom I consider myself one, are not claiming that the adaptation of society to changing circumstances is problematic. Nor is their chagrin directed at this, if this even be the case. The sort of intelligence which they are lamenting the loss of is the sort which has genuinely and quite evidently declined, and the suggestion is merely that this be a pity as it is a type of intelligence which man can well do with. Yes, it may be 'bookish' and analytical, but this type of intelligence is surely not mutually exclusive with the development of a new type of intelligence directed at current 'survival'.

My thinking is that the availability of expedient and bad quality information definitely has something to do with a general demotivation towards thinking of the kind which is an inch wide and miles deep- analysis. But I must concede this one point to the author: the hard and fast causal relationship attributed to the increase in internet information and a decline in an 'intelligence' is unsubstantiated and, therefore, a little ambitious. However, deeply critical and analytical thinking, in my view, is central to the continuing rationality of man, as well as scientific thinking and technological development we so deeply value as a species. So, the preservation of analytical thinking is not only important as a thing of beauty in its own right, but also as a means to an end.

An Experiment to do with Advertising, dear Reader.

Escher Art. Things being more than the sum of their parts.

Literature.

The Theatre. A world according to Tom Stoppard.

Should one even contemplate dining without Miles Davis?

Lessons of a classical kind. Willful Pandora into her Box.

More books. And maybe a continuous book fare?

Cinema Paradiso. For the admiration of Plot comprised of pictures.

Conversations about Lesson 7: A comment on a comment

Dear Reader

This post I have published in response to a comment to my last post. So, if you take a genuine interest in following the conversation please read that post (Lesson 7) first and then also read the comment by Anonymous. After that it will be reasonably safe to continue herewith.

Anonymous, regarding your very sophisticated desire to draw a distinction between meaning and determinacy, by challenging whether it is true that assertions need to be determinate to be meaningful (in the strict sense of the word, of course) I respond thus: By way of example you have given the possibility of observation influencing, on a sub-atomic level, the length of a piece of string. If I understand correctly, this would then alter the very thing being observed and therefore, in a nearly ironic way, making observation (verification) both the vehicle for meaning and simultaneously the underminer of meaning, because it changes that which is observed.

I would have to agree that in the strictest and most technical sense this sub-atomic change, if such a thing even does happen, may at first seem to pose a conundrum for semantic theory if it is verificationist by nature. However, my suggestion is this: The conundrum is more one for the scientists; who presumably are looking for exact descriptions for the objects and phenomena of the real world. Things changing on a sub-atomic level matters for a scientist, but does it matter for a linguist? Even for a verificationist linguist? When we look at linguistic behaviour, we must concede that most of referencing to the world happens on a supra-atomic level (unless we are intentionally making reference to actual sub-atomic structure and behaviour, of course). This would certainly be the case with an assertion about a piece of string which goes, "This piece of string exists". Such an assertion, I think you will agree, does not make refernce to the identity of a piece of string on a sub-atomic level. So, if there is a piece of string which can provide the truth conditions for the above statement, at the moment of speaking, then that is all that counts for a normal speaker. However, if a scientist says that "This piece of string exists" and on attempting to test such a hypothesis finds that, on every testing, the atoms are diminished, then my heart goes out to her. She is dealing either with an issue of identity (Is it still the same piece of string?) or she is dealing with a new phenomena (Do things change when observed?). But how will she ever know? It's a scientific problem but not a linguistic one. The study of science and language must come apart, you see.

But where semantic theory must stay true to verification is in the way that if an assertion is indeterminate (if there cannot exist knowable truth conditions for it) then it must deem the assertion meaningless- as in contentless. However, we should not get too concerned with the term meaningless either. It is not intended as grimly as it may come across.

And, dear and most beloved Anonymous, what to say about the repeatability of verification/falsification? Your questions are challenging, indeed. Let it just suffice to say that, according to something like a verificationist theory of meaning the meaning of assertions are best measured in the moment of articulation. Verification theory is problematic when it tries to comment of assertions made about the past or future, of course. This in itself, even without the possible non-repeatability of verification, poses a problem. Just verb tenses alone pose a problem. And I think the non-repeatability of verification (if and when this be the case) holds similar, but not exactly symmetrical problems, for the semantic theorist. The best way to address your question (and you ask this with the best of them, I assure you) would be to see 'meaning making' as a linguistic activity with overwhelmingly temporally based qualities.

Perception as context bound (so exceedingly astute as always, Anonymous): We know that Locke too made much of the fact that perception is conceptually loaded and that there simply is no overarching objective view point by which we can know the world around us. In other words, in the case of linguistic theory, an objective viewing of conditions which would make our assertions true. The bearer of the content of our language. We do seem to be compelled to accept that we simply cannot prove or demonstrate (except maybe by way of deduction, but this will not solve the problem will it?) that we have unbiased access to matters of fact. And this, undoubtedly, does not bode well for the verificationist. But I think this problem is sidestepped, and not just with the practice of some Sophistry, by remebering that we are busy with a meta-discourse here. In other words, we are attempting to lay out the principles for how meaning is imported into language. The task is not to actually import the meaning but to suggest that the content of our assertions, particularly if the assertions are making literal refernce to a world of mind independent objects and properties, is best seen as derived from the world to which it is making reference. This seems a priori true. If we are making reference to an objectively existing world the the content of our referncing assertions should be derived from such a world and we, in principle, we should at the very least expect to have access to the world we so gibly make reference to. If it turns out that Locke, and yourself dearest Anonymous, are right about possibly not having access to an independently existing world then this should not alter the requirements for meaning, I think. It merely says that most of what we do when we speak is misguided. But we should not lower the bar for meaning just because we cannot know whether we are able to achieve it.

Ah, the contstructivists. What to say about such a group of deserters? I ask this: Is it good and right to resort to saying that reality consists entirely as an extension of the human (and other thinking things') mind because one feels a bit despondent of the possibility of knowing an independently existing reality? To each his own, I suppose. My suggestion is that we remain agnostics about the existence of an external world. For the very reasons that yourself and John Locke mention in the previous question. And, constructivists being what they are, are not always very clear or very unified (but the latter should not be held against them- even though the first should) about what is they advocate. So, I caution the reader here: Some constructivists maintain that there are matters of fact which exist independently of our minds, but as we have no access to these (and this seems a priori true) such facts are irrelevant. And some say that there simply is (as in does not exists at all) matters of fact beyond what has been constructed by our minds. You will, I hope, agree that these are two different stand points, with enormously different further entailments. My comment to the first standpoint is that those matters of fact beyond our grasp are only irrelevant if completely ignored- in other words, not ever made reference to. But we know that this simply is not the case, which makes them very relevant and extremely problematic too. To the second standpoint I answer thus: Who knows? But I think it unlikely.

Once again, most admired Anonymous, your conversation is awesome- in the strictest sense of the word.

And so we reach the end of this. Till later.