A bit of philosophy: An important distinction

In Svorjak’s article on evil, wherein he explores the nature of, what he calls, radical sin he makes some interesting comments on some of the essential qualities of sin.

His argument rests entirely on the distinction between sin and danger, and he claims that mostly we confuse the two. Danger is, by his own stipulative definition, a value which is attributed to a situation or entity which is believed by the observer to be placing a threat on something they wish to protect. Like most of us he believes that sometimes the value of danger is misattributed and sometimes this is aptly done. But this is an issue in itself- which does not form part of his central argument. The reason for this is because it should not be difficult to observe, if the agent is being rational, when there is a real danger and when it is imagined.

However, when feelings of danger are confused for a certain detection of sin it becomes very difficult to pull the two apart. This is because mostly we are (and this is true across all cultures) hard wired for recognising evil. Whether Svorjak actually believes in sin as something which has independent existence is hard to determine from his argument, and maybe even irrelevant.

His point really is that, when the one is confused for the other it becomes impossible to even start looking at whether the danger is real. It raises defenses. It results in witch hunts and in crusades. His appeal, and this it must be said, has a normative or revisionary component. The request is that we use obvious observable evidence, reliable testimony and reason to determine whether the danger is real. If not it cannot be sin.

Another little bit of Philosophy: An abstract of something to come

Who, really, is afraid of objectivity?

In the current debates around truth, meaning and other such matters, much is said about whether or not truth should be construed as mind-independent. It is also a particular characteristic of the current debates which sees the term ‘mind-independent’ interchangeably used with the term ‘objective’. So, ‘mind-independent truth’ becomes analytically equivalent to ‘objective truth’. This is an unfortunate practice, leading to, what I believe, some of the impasses within this polemic. This confusion is further exacerbated by fallacies of equivocation when employing terms such as ‘fact’ within the speculations around whether facts are, once again, to be considered objective or not.

This paper sets about a very simple task: It aims to illustrate what some of the foundational terminology of the current debates could look like, and hints, but does not explore, what some of the immediate a priori consequences would be of accepting some of the proposed definitions.

For Adam- A bit of philosophy: Who, in the world, gets to eat?

When Mill went about his business in the later part of the Enlightenment period of Europe, some interesting things were said. Some of it, of course, was moral theory, our hero claimed, but there are those who will deny that moral theory based in, what seems like, economic principles, can make any sense at all. In other words, talking about ‘happiness’ as the measurement for what is good and right, simply does not describe what we take to be commonsense about such matters.

But what does all this have to do with eating, you ask?

It really has nothing to do with eating at all but, my suggestion is that, utilitarian theories, such as that proposed by Mill, may have something interesting to say about who, in this world, gets to eat. And why. And here ‘world’ is used in the literal sense. Being a great proponent of utilitarianism myself (even whilst thinking that Kant was more successful in some ways) I would like to suggest that the moral agent is, indeed, governed by utilitarian principles. And this is precisely the reason why there are people starving.

So, let’s assume that Mill is right, and that the following propositions are true:

1. That we are all predisposed to psychological hedonism. In other words, we cannot help aiming, with our every action, to increase our pleasure and decrease our pain. This, of course, cashes out differently for everyone on account of their individuality.

2. And then, Mill reasons, because my happiness is so important to me, it can be assumed that everyone’s happiness is important to them.

So far so good, dear reader.

3. He then goes on to say, and it is a pity that he does, that based in 1 and 2 above, it
can be assumed that general happiness is what everyone desires.

I shan’t go into the logical failings of this reasoning, but just hope that you can see, with me, that the argument has run horribly aground: The leap from ‘everyone’s happiness is important to them’ to ‘everyone’s happiness is important to everyone else’ is a tad, let’s call it, ambitious.

And it is precisely what is contained in this leap (that everyone’s happiness does not necessarily matter to me) that explains why there are starving people. So Mill, by a sort of fault in his reasoning, inadvertently demonstrates why it is that some have so much and others so little. Surprisingly, some small wisdom can be got from logic. Or maybe the lack of, I should say.

If the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer, and some are shutting down their organs for all the lusciousness of their favourite cuisine, while others’ bodies learn to manifest nutrients out of thin air, it is precisely because we do not care about everyone’s happiness.

Evidently, gluttony and starvation is an inevitable extension of our basic nature. One which could be constrained, of course, but not by another natural inclination, as Mill hopes to show.

To the Moral High Ground

You ask, where to and what do I mean?
Onwards to the moral high ground, of course!
A place that is innocuous, circumspect and clean
to the touch, to a show of force.
Onwards, to a place where hygiene is sanity
and infected thoughts are dangerous,
where doubt is only vanity
and new desires condemned, expeditious.

You ask, rightly, but what could be a sadder ending?
Nothing is sadder than the moral high ground, of course!
But to choose otherwise is to be defending
the lonely road on an unbridled horse.
So onwards, to a place where everything is good and right.
Without the frightening whims
of an earnestly coveted night;
Of wonderful passions but horribly hurtful sins.

C. Goodwin

A little bit of Philosophy: Moral or not

The debate, of course, is long, involved and much divided. It is riddled with the pedantic, and not such pedantic, distinctions which so characterises philosophy. And for meta-ethics the theoretical positions being occupied range from:
1. A sort of post-modern relativism in morality (where morality is reduced to nothing more than social construction, along with truth and knowledge)
2. Absolute moral objectivity, such as what Kant proposes with the logical necessity of moral laws (i.e. the Categorical Imperative)
3. The metaphysical stance of moral values being real things, with mind independent existence, which it is our duty to track correctly as moral agents. This position alone can then be divided into: A. Meta-ethicists proposing that moral judgment is “particularist” (stupid word- if you ask me), with the moral value of action being judged according to a whole lot of contingent facts in the environment and within the agent, but that the values are nevertheless real (as in objective). Untenable, entirely, of course. B. A Platonic sort position holding the obscure claim of certain actions and things having an inherent or innate sort of value. And this is somehow mysteriously related to the “essence” of that thing. The Form- the Greek sense, of course. Surely God only knows what Plato meant by this. Which, unfortunately, does not aid human enquiry.

The Juicy Bit: "But is it wrong to..."

So, dear reader and favourite person in the whole world, now that the theoretical map has been laid out, let us get to something a little more personal:

When Macbeth committed murder so foul, was it wrong because he was Scottish and, therefore, of a culture and religious persuasion which condemns murder? Was it wrong because it is irrational to commit murder if you yourself would not like to be subject to a murder? Or was it wrong because the action of murder itself, intrinsically, is wrong and will always be so- regardless of what the moral agent may think of it at any given time.
Or was it maybe not wrong of Macbeth to murder the Scottish king, because the particular circumstances, such as a very devious and persuasive wife, led him to believe that this action was justified?

But what does seem evident, is that nature and reason must come apart.

Macbeth had to choose.

A bit of philosophy: Theorising about the real world

An investigation into a theoretical instability of metaphysical realism. (Giving the title some more thought, though.)

(i) What does this project entail?
The intention is to expose a fundamental theoretical instability within a particular species of realism within current metaphysical discourse. The species of realism in which I am interested is that which both endorses a Correspondence notion of truth and holds that truth is evident transcendent. I believe that these two positions cannot be appealed to within the same project as they are, a priori, inconsistent with each other.

During the writing of my master’s thesis, wherein I investigate the meaning of which moral language is capable of I look, particularly, at the debate which has been set up between realism and anti-realism, but taken as semantic theories and not as metaphysical positions. Basically the argument forwarded in my master’s thesis is that, despite moral language being inherently realist by nature it is incapable of doing what it sets out to do- and that is reference objective moral facts. That moral propositions have an inherently realist quality seems to be a relatively uncontroversial notion, based on the fact that moral statements seem, quite evidently, to make reference to moral imperatives which are taken not to be subjectively true but objectively so. In other words, implicit in moral language (and moral discourse) is an assumption that there simply are some objective moral facts (and truths). Following from this description of moral language there exists, in current philosophy, a host of meaning theories on how we are to understand and treat moral truth and, therefore, the semantics of moral language. In my master’s thesis I argued that the inherently realist nature of moral language, in other words the fact that moral statements seem to make reference to mind independent moral facts, means that moral truth should (ought to) be regarded as epistemically constrained and moral language ought to be subject to verificationist types of theories in order to, philosophically, determine what meaning moral language is actually capable of. This was, needless to say, argued counter realism and the way in which realist theorists propose that we treat the truth and meaning of moral statements. The result, I argued, of forwarding such standards (the standards I insist are required) for moral language is that moral propositions are very rarely, if ever, capable of the sort of truth which their inherently realist nature demands (or implies). The suggestion is, therefore, that there exists a tension between what moral language sets out to do and what it is, in fact, capable of.

What follows is a problem which arose from doing the above investigation and, of course, from constructing the argument. My work for my master’s thesis provided the base and exposed the need for further investigation into theories about meaning. But with the project constituting the following thesis on realism in metaphysics, I propose to focus, first and foremost, on some very particular issues around knowledge and truth, as these seems to underpin theories about meaning

Most theorists endorsing realism in metaphysics subscribe to the Correspondence Principle of truth: That a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts (taking “matter of fact” to mean a certain, relevant state of affairs in the world). This principle, clearly, serves as a sort of definition for what truth is or of how it should be conceived. My understanding of this realist commitment to Correspondence theories about truth is that realism is founded on a metaphysical position which holds that there are certain mind independent properties of and objects in the world, and when we speak our propositions can only be true of they correspond to the matters of fact which constitute this mind independent state of affairs. It, therefore, seems perfectly reasonable, given the particular metaphysical commitments described, that realism must appeal to some sort of correspondence notion about truth.

The dilemma (and this will be the central research problem of this thesis), resulting in the theoretical instability of which I wish to speak, arises from the fact that the success of metaphysical realism requires truth to be regarded as evidence transcendent, but this stands in direct opposition to what a Correspondence theory of truth seems, in my view, to require a priori: That the Correspondence Principle of truth is a vacuous and unhelpful principle, unless it presupposes or includes a requirement of knowledge of such correspondence. In other words, in order for truth to be settled by the correspondence of propositions to matters of fact, there must be some appeal to knowledge itself- in order to establish whether there is actual correspondence. The problem arises from the fact that an evidence transcendent notion of truth, however, dismisses this necessity entirely. In other words, it appears, to me, that a realist definition of truth is incongruent, at the very least, with the way in which truth is treated (that being the obeisance to the classical principle of truth being validly deduced across inferential lines and, therefore, immune to the any sorts of epistemic requirements). In short then: there seems to be a tension between a realist definition of truth and the manner in which truth is established or settled on, within metaphysics.

This project will look at the inherently non-epistemic workings of truth in metaphysical realism and what, in my view, seems to be the inherently epistemic nature of a definition such as Correspondence Principle about truth. In a sense, it is being suggested that realism cannot lay claims to correspondence notions about truth because it generally takes truth to be evidence transcendent. It must give up either, on pain of inconsistency. My suggestion, of course, is that it gives up the notion of truth being evidence transcendent.

I see the proposed project at this stage of its development, resting heavily on endorsing the clear and absolute distinction between logical truths and epistemic truths. Or, rather, between necessary truths and contingent truths. And, therefore, I think much of the success of this project will hinge on forwarding, yet again, an argument around this classical and foundational philosophical topic. In a sense, it will be necessary for the project to persuade of the necessity of adopting a Humean stance on the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and where these appropriately serve, and do not serve, a philosophical discourse.

Very sketchily, I shall have to argue primarily for the following points (of course, many contributory points will have to be argued first in order to achieve even these):

That confusing logical and epistemic truths leads to dubious reasoning in nearly all fields of study hoping to establish any substantive truths about the nature of reality.

That a Correspondence theory about truth should be seen to either presuppose or entail speaker knowledge of the conditions which would show that “P” does indeed represent (correspond to) P, if it is to form part of a realist project of forwarding conclusively settled substantive metaphysical truths.

That an appeal to truth as evidence transcendent, a priori, undermines a Correspondence theory of truth.


That, if the above premises can be argued successfully, realism in much of metaphysics is, fundamentally, theoretically unstable unless this sort of realism gives up either evidence transcendent truth or its appeal to a Correspondence Principle of truth.


That, if the above is successfully argued, accepting truth as epistemically constrained seems as if it could to a better job, when pinned to the Correspondence Principle of truth, of forwarding the case of realism in metaphysics.


(A note: I shall be selecting some very specific metaphysical propositions for the purposes of the thesis in order to illustrate my argument. It should be clear that I do not think all metaphysical realism is untenable- in other words, not all realist metaphysical propositions are problematic. It will depend on various factors such as the knowability of the content, the sense of the proposition and maybe even the linguistic context in which the proposition is expressed.)

(ii) Why is this project important and interesting?
It is conceded that the existing polemic between realism and anti-realism is well developed and has, to quite a large degree, formed a central topic in current analytical philosophy. This, however, does not mean that all the issues have been resolved. Nor does it mean, as suggested by Quietism, that there are no issues at stake or that the issues at stake cannot be resolved. It is my view that much work needs to be done in terms of theories about meaning, for instance, and that there is a genuine problem with realist language being employed within certain discourses. It is the task of philosophy, I believe, to develop workable theories around issues such as truth and meaning. And it simply is not the case that realist metaphysics in philosophy is on solid ground. This should, quite evidently, be a problem which needs solutions- even if the only solutions, with any sort of epistemological integrity, are those which do not bode well for this particular area in philosophy.